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SHOT THROUGH THE HEART: THE FDA 
GIVES ALL HEALTH CARE COMPANY 
EXECUTIVES A BAD NAME UNDER THE 
CONTROVERSIAL STRICT-LIABILITY 
MISDEMEANOR PROVISION OF THE 
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
The government is pulling out a dusty old weapon from its arsenal to 
use as it embarks on a seemingly tyrannical mission against health care 
company executives.1 Recently,2 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)3 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ)4 expressed an intention to aggressively 
prosecute high-ranking executives of health care companies5 through the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Barry Meier, When Heart Devices Fail, Who Should Be Blamed?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
21, 2010, at B1 [hereinafter When Heart Devices Fail].  
[T]he Obama administration intends to push for more prosecutions of corporate 
officials, a move that is likely to please patient advocates but also to touch off intense 
debate. 
John M. Taylor III, counselor to the F.D.A. commissioner, Dr. Margaret Hamburg, said 
that the agency would soon start training agency personnel about the reach of the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 . . . . 
Id. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that over a ten-year span, only 271 individuals were 
charged with such violations. Brent J. Gurney, Howard M. Shapiro & Robert A. Mays, The Crime 
of Doing Nothing: Strict Liability for Corporate Officers Under the FDCA, WILMERHALE F-27 
n.45 (Dec. 3, 2007), available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/7b1c0866-a547 
-48c7-86d0-04d0449c03d7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c5eda281-2dae-4154-a0f8-
13b817f25b52/The_Crime_of_Doing_Nothing.pdf. 
 2. Historically, the FDA and DOJ would not bring misdemeanor criminal charges against 
high-level executives when they neither participated in nor knew of the illegal conduct. Karen F. 
Green et al., FDA Plans to Increase Strict Liability Criminal Prosecutions of Corporate 
Executives, WILMERHALE (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/fda_plans 
_to_increase_strict_liability_criminal_prosecutions_of_corporate_executives_03-11-2010/. 
 3. The FDA is a constituent agency of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 
(HHS). About FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices 
/default.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
 4. References made to the DOJ refer collectively to the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for all 
districts across the United States. See infra note 26 (providing more information on how the FDA 
and DOJ operate to investigate and prosecute violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act). 
 5. Letter from Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., Comm’r of Food and Drugs, to The Honorable 
Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Fin. (Mar. 4, 2010), available at 
http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/FDA-3-4-10-Hamburg-letter-to-Grassley-re-GAO-report-
on-OCI.pdf. This letter explained steps taken to address the Committee’s recommendation that the 
FDA “increase the appropriate use of misdemeanor prosecutions, a valuable enforcement tool, to 
hold responsible corporate officials accountable.” Id. It also noted that the “FDA will enhance its 
procedures to support the development of debarment and disqualification actions, and . . . will 
clarify the circumstances under which such administrative actions may proceed concurrently with 
pending criminal investigations and prosecutions.” Id.  
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use of the controversial strict-liability misdemeanor provision6 of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).7 Without having to prove 
anything more than the executive’s position on the corporate ladder,8 the 
government can sit back and watch guilty pleas roll in from powerless 
companies and their executives. The careers of many of these professional 
men and women will come to an undeserved and abrupt end when they are 
branded with a scarlet criminal record.9 The impetus behind this “new 
approach . . . reflects frustration with corporate recidivism even in the face 
of ramped-up fines, penalties and disgorgements.”10 Yet, the proposed 
means are not narrowly tailored to achieve the ends. For example, when the 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2006) (detailing prohibited activities); 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2006) 
(imposing misdemeanor punishments of imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not 
more than $1,000 or both for violations of § 331). If any such violation constitutes a second 
conviction or is found to have been committed “with the intent to defraud or mislead,” the 
violation becomes a felony, carrying a maximum of three years of imprisonment and a fine of not 
more than $10,000 or both. Id. Since the Supreme Court’s endorsement, in United States v. Park, 
of the strict-liability provision in the FDCA, there have only been thirteen cases “in which the 
government charged a corporate executive with a misdemeanor FDCA violation based solely on 
the executive’s ‘responsible relation’ to the violation.” Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-17, F-25 
n.39. Records show that  
the overall number of FDCA criminal prosecutions has been small, and misdemeanor 
prosecutions have been rare or nonexistent. This conservative use of the “responsible 
corporate officer” doctrine has also shown itself in a series of major settlements reached 
in criminal investigations of major [health care] companies since 2000. Each of these 
cases presented circumstances in which the government clearly could have charged 
individual executives with misdemeanor (if not felony) FDCA violations, or demanded 
misdemeanor pleas as part of any settlement. Yet none of these major settlements has 
involved individual criminal charges under the FDCA. 
Id. at F-18 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
 7. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399a (2006). 
 8. John W. Lundquist & Sandra L. Conroy, Defending Against Food & Drug Prosecutions, 
THE CHAMPION, July 1997, at 20 (“[The FDA] does not often refer cases for criminal prosecution, 
but when it does, it can be a formidable adversary. Among the weapons at its disposal are a 
statutory scheme imposing strict liability on offenders and a doctrine of corporate responsibility 
that allows the FDA to target virtually any high-ranking corporate official simply by virtue of the 
position he or she occupies, even though the defendant performed no acts in furtherance of the 
alleged criminal violation.”). 
 9. See generally Daniel R. Margolis, Mark R. Hellerer & Aaron S. Dyer, FDA to Bring More 
Criminal Charges Against Executives for Companies’ FDCA Violations, PILLSBURY CLIENT 
ALERT (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/D98DF569EA 
917C29C8CE406316FA213C.pdf (discussing the trend of bringing misdemeanor criminal actions 
against corporate executives under the FDCA). “[I]ndividuals convicted [of unintentional 
violations] are potentially vulnerable to administrative exclusion from federal health care 
programs, which in practice can rule out future employment in the health care industry.” Green et 
al., supra note 2.  
 10. Ken Stier, HHS Learns from SEC: Fraudster Execs Will be Barred from Drug Industry, 
CNN MONEY (June 16, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/04/news/companies/astrazeneca 
_pharmaceutical_fines.fortune/index.htm. Lewis Morris, chief counsel to the Inspector General, 
explains that the government is “going to start to use that authority in the appropriate 
circumstances to get high level executives out of companies, so that the company has a better shot 
at changing its behavior.” Id.  
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failure of medical devices results in serious injury or death, using high-
ranking executives as scapegoats,11 rather than charging individuals who are 
directly responsible for the corporation’s FDCA violation, will not combat 
recidivism12 to achieve the ultimate goal of protecting the patients.13 From 
the government’s point of view, this may be the quickest and easiest way, 
but it is not the most effective and fairest means to deter corporate criminal 
behavior. 
Instead, the government should conduct focused investigations of the 
specific sect of the corporation responsible for the particular FDCA 
violation(s) to reveal the direct culprit(s), who are often in a lower echelon 
of the corporate hierarchy.14 To achieve this end, Congress should amend 
the misdemeanor provision of the FDCA, which currently allows corporate 
executives to be charged with crimes committed by employees or agents of 
their companies,15 even if they had no knowledge of the criminal activity.16 
An open-ended, strict-liability criminal offense such as this could have the 
chilling effect of putting innocent businesspeople behind bars.17 The current 
policies behind investigations and prosecutions under the penalty provisions 
of the FDCA do not actually result in imprisoning guilty individuals.18 An 
amendment to this provision should require the government to prove 
criminal intent to some degree, depending on whether it chooses to charge 
under a misdemeanor or felony offense.19 
                                                                                                                 
 11. This is not to say that all figurehead executives, CEOs, or presidents of companies are not 
culpable. See United States v. Prigmore, 243 F.3d 1, 3, 24 (1st Cir. 2001) (arguing that there was 
“substantial evidence” that the corporate executive defendants had in fact committed serious 
conspiracy “to defraud and impair the functioning of the [FDA] in connection with its oversight 
and regulation of [Class III] medical devices”). 
 12. When Heart Devices Fail, supra note 1. In this note, however, I argue that this is the 
wrong means to achieve that end. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Oftentimes, managers of certain divisions of a company are directly responsible for 
ensuring compliance with regulations and monitoring a smaller group of employees. These 
individuals are likely to be more knowledgeable about violations and preventing them than the 
highest ranking figurehead of the corporation. See Assaf Hamdani, Essay, Mens Rea and the Cost 
of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 415, 447 (2007). 
 15. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-20.  
 16. Margolis et al., supra note 9, at 1.  
 17. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-18. This is not to say that there are not circumstances 
where figurehead executives may be criminally liable. In those situations, they should be held 
accountable. 
 18. In United States v. Guidant LLC, federal prosecutors and the executives on trial entered 
into plea agreements, dropping the prison sentence in exchange for higher monetary fines. United 
States v. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 903, 921–22 (D. Minn. 2010). 
 19. In addition, the DOJ can impose administrative enforcement and civil sanctions if it finds 
criminal prosecution is inappropriate. These include “impos[ing] a ‘clinical hold’ on the drug or 
device, seek injunctive relief against violators, seize products and materials, debar or suspend 
organizations and individuals from operating in the regulated field, and impose civil monetary 
penalties.” Lundquist & Conroy, supra note 8, at 21 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.42; 21 U.S.C.  
§ 332(a); 21 U.S.C. § 334; 21 U.S.C. § 335(a); 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(f), 335(b), and 21 C.F.R. Part 
17).  
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This note will focus on the criminal prosecutions under the FDCA of 
high-ranking executives of Class III medical device manufacturing 
companies.20 In light of the recent announcements to aggressively prosecute 
executives of medical device corporations,21 and the prevalence of repeat 
violations of the FDCA by these companies,22 congressional action is 
necessary. Part I presents an overview of the FDA as a regulatory and 
enforcement agency with particular emphasis on the FDCA. Part II 
                                                                                                                 
 20. The term medical “device” is defined within the FDCA as the following: 
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, 
or other similar or related article, including a component, part, or accessory which is-- 
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States 
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,  
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or  
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other 
animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through 
chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not 
dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended 
purposes. 
21 U.S.C. § 321(h).  
There are 3 FDA regulatory classifications of medical devices: Class I, Class II and 
Class III. The classifications are assigned by the risk the medical device presents to the 
patient . . . . As the classification level increases, the risk to the patient and FDA 
regulatory control increase. . . . 
. . . . 
Class III medical devices have the most stringent regulatory controls. For Class III 
medical devices, sufficient information is not available to assure safety and 
effectiveness through the application of General Controls and Special Controls. Class 
III devices usually support or sustain human life, are of substantial importance in 
preventing impairment of human health, or present a potentially unreasonable risk of 
illness or injury to the patient. Typically, Pre-Market Approval (PMA) submission to 
the FDA is required to allow marketing of a Class III medical device. . . . Examples of 
Class III devices that require PMA are: replacement heart valves, silicone gel-filled 
breast implants, and implanted cerebella stimulators. 
Gary Syring, Overview: FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, QUALITY & REG. ASSOCIATES 
(May 6, 2003), available at http://www.qrasupport.com/FDA_MED_ DEVICE.html. For a 
critique of the FDA Class III medical device pre- and post-market approval process, see generally 
Michael VanBuren, Note, Closing the Loopholes in the Regulation of Medical Devices: The Need 
for Congress to Reevaluate Medical Device Regulation, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 441 (2007). The 
FDCA regulates several industries, and thus applies to food, pharmaceutical, medical device, and 
cosmetic companies; therefore, I caution the reader that my proposal to abolish the misdemeanor 
provision will, by default, affect all entities and individuals subject to the FDCA. See Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399. 
 21. See supra note 1. 
 22. John T. Boese, Beth C. McClain & Benjamin Hernandez-Stern, Healthcare Behind Bars: 
The Use of Criminal Prosecutions in Forcing Corporate Compliance, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 
91, 94 (2009). 
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examines two seminal Supreme Court decisions23 which established the 
controversial responsible corporate officer doctrine that enables the DOJ to 
prosecute the high-ranking corporate individuals.24 Part III considers a 
recent case where a Class III medical device manufacturer—along with its 
top executives—was charged with violating the FDCA and the ensuing 
controversial plea agreement.25 Part IV proposes an amendment to the 
FDCA that abolishes or revises the strict-liability misdemeanor provision. 
This will require prosecutors to prove criminal intent in the prosecution of 
corporate defendants. Finally, I conclude by critiquing the current 
prosecutorial policies and demonstrating how the revised FDCA and 
proposed new policies will achieve more effective and fair results. 
I. INSIDE THE GOVERNING AGENCIES AND REGULATION 
A. FEDERAL AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR FDCA REGULATIONS 
AND PROSECUTION26 
The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health and safety by 
regulating industries that produce certain products, such as food, drugs, and 
cosmetics.27 The agency investigates violations of the FDCA,28 which 
                                                                                                                 
 23. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 
(1975). 
 24. Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1245, 1246 (2006). “Responsible corporate office doctrine” is used 
interchangeably with “responsible relation doctrine,” which is also commonly referred to as the 
“Park doctrine.” 
 25. United States v. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907–08 (D. Minn. 2010).  
 26. White-collar criminal defense and complex civil litigation attorneys Gurney, Shapiro and 
Mays explain that 
[m]ost criminal prosecutions [begin] with a visit from an FDA inspector, and charges 
rarely [are] filed without a prosecution recommendation from the agency. Today, there 
is a virtual constant stream of announcements of plea deals and multi-million dollar 
settlements between prosecutors, led by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the Office of 
Consumer Litigation, and pharmaceutical companies. These cases originate at DOJ, in 
the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, with civil qui tam complaints, and elsewhere; probably few 
originate or are meaningfully steered by FDA. And it is not surprising that prosecutors 
who know less about how the industry in fact operates take a more favorable view of a 
provision that essentially puts the burden on executives to ensure perfect compliance 
with the FDCA throughout their companies. 
   At the same time, it makes much less sense today than it did in 1938 to indulge the 
fiction that executives—in pharmaceuticals or any other industry—can personally carry 
this burden. We no longer live in a world of neighborhood druggists and family-owned 
companies that directly supervise their own employees and operations. Modern-day 
pharmaceutical executives “supervise” the work of sometimes hundreds of thousands of 
employees and scores of corporate entities in dozens of countries. 
Gurney, supra note 1, at F-22 (footnote omitted).  
 27. About FDA, supra note 3. 
 28. Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation 
/Legislation/default.htm (last updated May 4, 2011).  
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regulates the manufacture and distribution of, inter alia, medical devices to 
ensure efficacy and safety.29 Pursuant to the FDCA’s goals as a public 
health law, FDCA violations are punishable by criminal penalties, as well 
as civil sanctions.30 
Within the FDA, the Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI)31 conducts 
criminal investigations of companies and individuals suspected of violating 
FDA regulations and “collect[s] evidence to support successful 
prosecutions.”32 OCI agents gather information and evidence and refer the 
case to the DOJ—specifically, to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the 
appropriate jurisdiction.33 As a constituent of the FDA, OCI plays an 
integral part in the corporate investigation, providing U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices, which typically lack expertise in these medical industries, with 
expert information about sophisticated FDA-regulated products.34 While the 
DOJ has the ultimate discretion to dismiss or prosecute alleged FDCA 
violations,35 U.S. Attorney’s Offices secure guilty pleas or convictions in a 
significant number of OCI referrals.36 Those companies and individuals 
found guilty under the FDCA can expect to pay multi-million dollar fines 
                                                                                                                 
 29. What does FDA do?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA 
/Transparency/Basics/ucm194877.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter What does FDA 
do?].  
 30. Carol Benjamin & Betsy J. Floman, Federal Food and Drug Act Violations, 31 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 629, 630 (1994); see also 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2006). 
 31. OCI was formed in 1992. From its beginning to 2009, OCI obtained 4,392 convictions that 
resulted in the imposition of $9.89 billion in fines and restitution and forfeited assets worth over 
$1 billion. Hamburg, supra note 5, at 1.  
 32. Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm123027.htm (last updated May 
29, 2009). 
 33. Lundquist & Conroy, supra note 8, at 21.  
 34. FDA Criminal Unit Guards Public Health, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 2011), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048718.pdf 
[hereinafter FDA Criminal Unit Guards Public Health]. 
 35. Lundquist & Conroy, supra note 8, at 21. (“Despite the fact that the decision to pursue 
criminal prosecution is one of pure discretion, the presence of certain factors are predictive of 
prosecution. . . . In addition, if the violation was intentional, easily detectable, preventable, 
fraudulent, or life threatening, prosecution will be more likely. Violations which cause economic 
injury are viewed no differently than violations which cause injury to the public health.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 36. See FDA Criminal Unit Guards Public Health, supra note 34, at 2; FDA Law Enforcers 
Protect Consumers’ Health Inside the Office of Criminal Investigations, FDA (Aug. 19, 2008, 
8:18 PM), http://foodconsumer.org/7777/8888/L_aws_amp_Reg_64/081908182008_FDA_Law 
_Enforcers_Protect_Consumers_Health_Inside_the_Office_of_Criminal_Investigations.shtml (“In 
a typical year, FDA’s Special Agents will investigate about 1,000 criminal cases resulting in the 
arrests of hundreds of suspected violators of public health laws. On average, 200 criminal suspects 
are convicted each year as the result of OCI investigations. From 1993 to [2008], OCI has made 
4,593 arrests that resulted in 3,546 convictions and more than $5.7 billion in fines and 
restitutions.”). 
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and are threatened with federal prison sentences.37 The FDA has been most 
active in prosecuting medical device companies for FDCA violations.38 
Earlier this year, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
put the FDA’s “hand to the fire” for inadequate oversight of OCI.39 In a 
scathing report, GAO found that the FDA “lacks performance measures that 
could enhance its oversight of OCI by allowing it to assess OCI’s overall 
success.”40 Notwithstanding its concession “that OCI’s impact on protecting 
the public health cannot be measured solely by the number of arrests and 
convictions,”41 GAO insisted on the FDA implementing an adequate review 
process that would focus on accountability.42 Pursuant to this report, OCI 
announced several changes to improve its effectiveness—the most 
controversial of which is “increas[ing] the appropriate use of misdemeanor 
prosecutions . . . to hold responsible corporate officials accountable.”43 In 
addition, the office will “enhance its procedures to support the development 
of debarment and disqualification actions.”44 OCI hopes these changes will 
satisfy GAO’s mandates to crack down on corporate recidivism.45 
Nevertheless, it seems as though OCI will be taking the blame out on 
corporate executives for its own inadequacies. 
B. THE FDCA 
The FDCA was originally passed by Congress and signed into law in 
1938.46 Replacing the ineffective 1906 Food and Drugs Act,47 the FDCA 
was adopted in response to a public outcry that ensued following over 100 
deaths caused by an adulterated pharmaceutical.48 The drug company 
produced an untested “wonder drug” marketed for pediatric patients, which 
                                                                                                                 
 37. FDA Criminal Unit Guards Public Health, supra note 34, at 1. “Criminal charges [against 
individual defendants] will generally not be dismissed in return for a guilty plea by a corporate 
defendant.” Benjamin & Floman, supra note 30, at 641.  
 38. Lundquist & Conroy, supra note 8, at 6. FDA also actively prosecutes FDCA violations in 
areas of adulteration, misbranding, and clinical investigations. Id.  
 39. Shepard Mullin, FDA Looks to Boost Criminal Prosecutions, FDA LAW BLOG UPDATE 
(Mar. 11, 2010, 6:44 AM), http://www.fdalawblog.com/2010/03/articles/legislation/fda-looks-to-
boost-criminal-prosecutions/; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-221, FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION: IMPROVED MONITORING AND DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CRIMINAL AND MISCONDUCT 
INVESTIGATIONS 10 (2010), [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new 
.items/d10221.pdf. 
 40. GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 10.  
 41. Id. at 17.  
 42. Id. at 25.  
 43. Hamburg, supra note 5.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. FDA History-Part II, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA 
/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054826.htm (last updated June 6, 2009). 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
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unknowingly turned out to be highly toxic.49 This event propelled Congress 
and President Roosevelt to enact a regulatory law to standardize and control 
the production, approval processes, and labeling of drugs, medical devices, 
food, and cosmetics.50 The FDCA has been amended several times over the 
years, evolving into its current powerful and comprehensive form.51 
Title 21 in the Code of Federal Regulations Parts 800 et seq.,52 
promulgated by the FDA53 pursuant to the FDCA (21 U.S.C § 331 et 
seq.),54 codifies specific rules and regulations applicable to certain entities, 
such as medical device manufacturers.55 It sets forth guidelines ranging 
from the classification of medical devices56 and pre- and post-market 
approval requirements,57 including proper labeling and distribution 
procedures58 to providing definitions of all relevant industry terms.59 The 
FDA enforces these regulations to promote the safety and efficacy of 
products’ intended uses.60 
Of particular importance in this note are the criminal penalty terms set 
forth in the FDCA.61 The misdemeanor provision (§ 333(a)(1)) provides 
that “[a]ny person who violates a provision of section 331 of this title shall 
be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or 
both.”62 Section 333(a)(2) stipulates,  
Notwithstanding the [misdemeanor provisions], if any person commits 
such a violation after a conviction of him under this section has become 
final, or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.; FDA History-Part IV, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov 
/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm055137.htm (last updated June 18, 2009). 
 51. FDA History-Part III, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA 
/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm055118.htm (last updated June 18, 2009). 
 52. Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. §§ 800–1299 (2010). 
 53. Code of Federal Regulations – Title 21 – Food and Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Databases/ucm135680.htm 
(last updated June 19, 2009).  
 54. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399(a) (2006). 
 55.  See, e.g., Rules & Regulations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov 
/RegulatoryInformation/RulesRegulations/default.htm (last updated June 18, 2009). 
 56. Device Classification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices 
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/default.htm (last updated Apr. 27, 
2009).  
 57. See, e.g., How to Market Your Device, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice 
/default.htm (last updated Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter How to Market Your Device]; Postmarket 
Requirements (Devices), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices 
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequirements/default.htm (last updated Mar. 13, 
2012). 
 58. How to Market Your Device, supra note 57.  
 59. Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. §§ 800–1299 (2010).  
 60. See, e.g., What does FDA do?, supra note 29. 
 61. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2006).  
 62. Id. § 333(a)(1).  
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such person shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not 
more than $10,000, or both.63  
A close examination of these two provisions highlights some serious 
issues. First, the misdemeanor provision is a strict-liability offense, 
requiring no proof of any knowledge with respect to the alleged violation.64 
Second, while the felony provision requires proof of “intent to defraud or 
mislead” under some circumstances, it can also be applied when an 
individual is charged a second time under the misdemeanor provision.65 In 
effect, an individual executive can be charged with a misdemeanor violation 
under § 333(a)(1) and several years later be charged with a second 
misdemeanor violation which would then constitute a felony according to  
§ 333(a)(2).66 This could happen even if the individual executive is named 
in criminal prosecutions under § 333(a) when working for different 
companies several years apart.67 Although this will likely have a deterrent 
effect, it is an excessive punishment to impose on these individuals. 
Congress increased the maximum fines, requiring individuals to pay 
$100,000 per count and $250,000 if a death occurred, and corporations to 
pay $200,000 to $500,000 for each count charged.68 Additionally, 
amendments made to the Sentencing Guidelines in 2008 resulted in an 
increased likelihood of prison time for misdemeanor convictions under the 
FDCA.69 These two changes “stacked the cards” in the government’s favor 
even more, causing individuals charged with misdemeanor offenses to enter 
into plea agreements, hoping to perhaps exchange a prison sentence for an 
increased fine.70 Thus, corporate executives have no other choice but to 
plead guilty and pay the ramped up fines to avoid a scarlet criminal record 
and jail time. 
II. JUSTICE SERVED OR JUSTICE DENIED? 
A short primer on criminal law is necessary to fully understand why the 
FDCA’s strict-liability penalty provision needs to be amended. 
                                                                                                                 
 63. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2006).  
 64. Monograph, Office of Consumer Litigation, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov 
/civil/docs_forms/OCPL_Monograph.pdf, 4 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
 65. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2).  
 66. Id.  
 67. See Gurney et al., supra note 1, F-17.  
 68. Melissa Gilmore & Brian K. Parker, FDA Sharpens Enforcement Teeth: Pre-Warning 
Letter Executive Misdemeanor Charges Expected to Rise, MCGUIREWOODS (Apr. 27, 2010), 
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/item.asp?item=4722.  
 69. Margolis et al., supra note 9, at 2.  
 70. FDA Announces New Push to Prosecute Corporate Officers and Executives for No-Intent 
Crimes, SKADDEN, 3 (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51 
&itemID=2003 [hereinafter FDA Announces New Push] (noting that three Purdue Pharma 
executives who were charged with violations of the FDCA and accepted a strict-liability 
misdemeanor plea paid $34 million in criminal fines). 
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A. A BACKGROUND ON CRIMINAL LAW 
The principle purpose of criminal law is to prevent harm to society.71 
Any criminal offense is considered to be more reprehensible than even the 
most outrageous civil violation.72 Criminals are generally viewed as 
menaces to society, who ought to be punished for their wrongdoing.73 
Therefore, our American criminal justice system strives to discourage 
certain conduct that does not fit within socially “normal” behavior.74 
Because of this, criminal punishment is markedly different from civil 
sanctions.75 Usually, regardless of how egregious a civil liability is, the 
worst punishment will only be monetary.76 Criminal conduct, however, is 
punished by both monetary sanctions and the threat of incarceration; in 
some instances, the death penalty may even be imposed. The stigma behind 
being accused and convicted of any crime is so offensive that even if it 
results in a mere “slap on the wrist” and a fine, the devastation to the 
individual’s integrity remains.77 
Another important distinction between civil and criminal liability is that 
the government is held to a higher burden of proof than parties in civil 
cases. The prosecutor must prove every material element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt78 whereas the civil burden of proof is a mere 
preponderance of the evidence.79 The legal principle—“it is better that ten 
guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer”80—coined by English 
jurist William Blackstone signifies the magnitude and importance of the 
constitutional protection of a defendant’s individual liberties and freedom. 
                                                                                                                 
 71. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Matthew Bender & Company, 
Inc, 5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW]. 
 72. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 3 (Thompson/West, 4th 
ed. 2007) [hereinafter CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW]. 
 73. Id. at 2.  
 74. Id. at 3.  
 75. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 2.  
 76. See id. Criminal law is distinguished from civil by the “societal condemnation and stigma 
that accompanies the conviction.” Id.  
 77. Corporate executives will suffer from the “personal and professional stain of simply being 
charged with a crime in the first instance.” Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-17.  
 78. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 68.  
 79. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as 
[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number 
of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; 
superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all 
reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the 
issue rather than the other. This is the burden of proof in most civil trials, in which the 
jury is instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the stronger evidence, 
however slight the edge may be. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (5th pocket ed. 2004). 
 80. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.  
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In general, a criminal act contains two components: the actus reus and 
the mens rea.81 The actus reus (i.e., the prohibited act that causes a social 
harm) is required for every crime.82 Typically, this is defined as an 
affirmative action; however, albeit extremely uncommon, a person can be 
prosecuted for failing to act, known as a criminal act of omission.83 
Therefore, the actus reus is best understood as the prohibition of certain 
conduct that causes a specific result by either action or inaction.84 
Following this principle, one cannot be criminally charged with a “status 
offense”—that is, simply possessing some state of being, such as 
alcoholism, drug addiction, or homelessness.85 While every offense must 
define a particular forbidden act,86 not all crimes require a culpable state of 
mind.87 
Despite being “deeply rooted in our legal tradition as one of our first 
principles of law,”88 there is much debate as to the precise understanding of 
what is the mens rea.89 In the general sense, mens rea connotes a “morally 
blameworthy state of mind.”90 But the mens rea also has a more narrowly 
tailored definition, which is specifically associated with each actus reus 
defined in the offense.91 Scholars call this the “elemental” definition of 
mens rea.92 There are four levels of culpability: purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, and negligence.93 The most serious offenses, which carry the 
greatest penalties, require the prosecutor to prove the defendant committed 
the act purposely or knowingly. In some instances, however, penal codes 
assign lower levels of mental culpability (e.g., recklessness or criminal 
negligence) to serious offenses where it is far too difficult to prove the 
defendant’s mental state, or where the act is considered so reprehensible or 
affects a large number of people that the legislature does not require proof 
of any mens rea.94 In other words, it does not matter that the defendant did 
or did not intend to commit the offensive act; the fact that he committed the 
                                                                                                                 
 81. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 85.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 105.  
 84. Id. at 85, 105.  
 85. Id. at 96–100.  
 86. Id. at 87.  
 87. Id. at 145.  
 88. United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), discussed in 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 147. 
 89. CASE AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 148 (“I have always thought 
that most of the difficulties as to the mens rea was due to having no precise understanding what 
the mens rea is.”) (quoting 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 4 (M. Wolfe, ed. 1953) (letter of July 14, 
1916) (Oliver Wendell Holmes).  
 90. CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 148.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. (Official Draft 
and Explanatory Notes 1985). 
 94. See generally UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 145–51.  
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act is enough to convict. These are called strict-liability offenses.95 Yet, 
these types of offenses are rare exceptions to the rule. Strict liability is most 
often applied in the “public welfare” context, where penalties for violations 
are usually minor, such as a small monetary fine or a very short jail 
sentence.96 
There is a strong presumption against strict liability.97 According to the 
canons of statutory interpretation, when there is no mens rea written in the 
statute of a certain offense, it is assumed that at least criminal negligence is 
attached and must be proven.98 
In summary, crimes generally consist of the actus reus and mens rea.99 
The actus reus is usually a voluntary act,100 but in rare instances can also be 
a criminal act of omission.101 While strict-liability offenses may consist of 
just actus reus,102 the defendant can never be accused of just a culpable 
state of mind.103 These principles are graphically summarized below and 
illustrate how the FDCA’s misdemeanor provision does not fall within any 
category of criminal offenses. Therefore, it belongs outside the ambit of 
criminal law, unless an amendment is made to include some level of mental 
culpability that will rectify its current misinterpretation and application. The 
following chart provides a comparison of the elements of the rape and 
homicide statutes to the FDCA’s misdemeanor provision. 
 
Comparison of Elements in Common Crimes to the FDCA’s Misdemeanor 
Provision 
 Mens rea (purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly, or 
negligently) 
Actus reus (voluntary act or legal 
omission causing social harm) 
No crime No mens rea No act 
Rape (MPC § 
213.1) 
No mens rea (strict 
liability) 
Engages in sexual intercourse with 
a female by means of force, threats 
of bodily injury, or intoxicants or 
while the female is unconscious or 
less than ten years old. 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (3rd pocket ed. 2006) (defining “strict liability” 
as “liability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the 
breach of an absolute duty to make something safe”).  
 96. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 147.  
 97. Id. at 146.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 85.  
 100. Id. at 87.  
 101. Id. at 105.  
 102. Id. at 145.  
 103. Id. at 86–87.  
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Comparison of Elements in Common Crimes to the FDCA’s Misdemeanor 
Provision 
 Mens rea (purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly, or 
negligently) 
Actus reus (voluntary act or legal 
omission causing social harm) 
Negligent 
Homicide 
(MPC § 210.4) 
Negligently Causes the death of another human 
being 
Manslaughter 
(MPC § 210.3) 
Recklessly  Causes the death of another human 
being 
Murder 
(MPC § 210.2) 
Purposely or knowingly Causes the death of another human 
being 
   
The FDCA’s 
Misdemeanor 
Provision  
(21 U.S.C.  
§ 333(a)) 
No mens rea (strict 
liability) 
No act—executives “held 
accountable for criminal misdeeds 
simply by virtue of their 
position”104 (i.e., criminal 
omission)  
 
While a strict-liability offense may be appropriate in the context of 
FDCA violations because it is a public welfare offense, the misdemeanor 
provision of the FDCA has not only been interpreted as strict liability, but 
also criminalizes an act of omission.105 Nothing could be more contrary to 
the fundamental principles of American criminal law.106 It combines the 
rarest form of actus reus with the rare strict-liability principle to form a 
highly controversial and unfair criminal offense. High-ranking executives 
of health care companies can be charged based on either their status in the 
corporate hierarchy, or their failure to act, and without wrongful intent or 
knowledge of any criminal conduct.107 It could not reasonably have been 
Congress’ intent to impose criminal penalties for merely possessing a 
certain position or status in one’s place of employment. Nor could it 
reasonably have been Congress’ intent to criminalize an executive’s failure 
to monitor each employee’s conduct without having to prove any intent in 
his failure to act. As discussed above, canons of statutory interpretation 
require that any criminal offense that does not expressly include a mental 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Mark Carlisle Levy & Gregory G. Schwab, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine—
The Doctrine no Longer Sleeps for Drug and Device Companies, SAUL EWING UPDATE, 7 
(July/Aug. 2010), http://www.saul.com/media/article/1018_PDF_2736.pdf. 
 105. See Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10; Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1274–85 (discussing 
criminal omissions and finding that the responsible relation doctrine is a form of criminal 
omission, which “raises more questions than it answers” because “even morally reprehensible 
omissions, are not punished as crimes”).  
 106. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 85.  
 107. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-9.  
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culpability deemed by default must impose at least criminal negligence. 
Therefore, the FDCA’s misdemeanor provision should only be interpreted 
as an executive’s negligent or reckless failure to monitor employees whose 
conduct has caused a harm. 
It is also important to note that it has long been standard prosecutorial 
policy not to charge individuals with misdemeanor violations of the FDCA 
specifically because it was unfair to make a criminal out of an individual 
executive without proving any knowledge of the wrongdoing.108 Instead, 
individual executives would only be prosecuted under the felony provision 
when there was clear intent involved.109 
B. THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE 
In 1943, the Supreme Court authorized no-intent misdemeanor 
prosecutions in Dotterweich v. United States,110 and again in 1975 in United 
States v. Park.111 Both cases involved violations of § 333(a)(1) of the 
FDCA by FDA-regulated companies and resulted in convictions of the 
accused high-ranking corporate executives.112 The defendant in 
Dotterweich, who was the president and general manager of a 
pharmaceutical company, was charged and convicted for three counts of 
pharmaceutical misbranding  
based on a single order from a single physician. One drug in the shipment 
included an ingredient that had been removed from the official formula 
listed on the “National Formulary.” Another was less potent than required 
by the government and than indicated on the label. Dotterweich had no 
personal connection to the particular shipment for which he was charged; 
his only connection was that he was “in general charge of the 
corporation’s business and had given general instructions to its employees 
to fill orders received from physicians.” He was convicted, while the 
corporation was acquitted.113  
The rationale behind the court’s conclusion to “dispense[] with the 
conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some 
wrongdoing” was based on the “interest of the larger good [to put] the 
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in 
responsible relation to a public danger.”114 
                                                                                                                 
 108. When Heart Devices Fail, supra note 1, at 4.  
 109. Id.  
 110. See generally United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
 111. See generally United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
 112. See generally Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277; Park, 421 U.S. 658. 
 113. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10 (quoting United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 
F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942), rev’d sub nom., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278 
(1943)).  
 114. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.  
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Over thirty years later, the Court returned to this issue and clarified 
Dotterweich’s responsible relation doctrine in Park.115 In Park, the 
president of a large national food store chain was charged and convicted 
with five counts of violating the FDCA for causing the adulteration of food 
due to rat infestations in the company’s warehouses.116 Park was fully 
aware that the system to ensure sanitary conditions was inadequate, and 
although he was responsible for ensuring that sanitation measures were 
sufficient, he failed to implement a more effective system.117 
Notwithstanding his awareness of the violations, Park, like Dotterweich, 
was convicted based on his status as a “supervisor[] or manager[] who 
st[ood] in ‘responsible relation’ to the violation by virtue of [his] authority 
and responsibility.”118 
The responsible relation doctrine is faulty because in neither of the 
seminal cases does the Supreme Court’s rationale “clearly explain from 
what authority the doctrine is derived [and] how the doctrine relates to the 
elements of the offense.”119 Scholars have attempted to justify the doctrine 
based on the need to encourage corporate executives to avoid conduct that 
threatens the public health and safety, despite the recognition that this will 
be a “potentially onerous . . . obligation” to impose on these individuals.120 
This deterrence explanation overlooks the fact that almost every criminal 
offense poses an equally grave threat to public health and welfare121 (e.g., 
homicide statutes). Furthermore, criminal law generally does not set out to 
prohibit acts of omission and hold individuals liable for failing to prevent 
certain conduct or unwanted results from occurring.122 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Park, 421 U.S. 658.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 664–65.  
 118. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1251. The FDCA has been interpreted to extend “to all those 
having such ‘a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws.’” 
Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10 (quoting Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284).  
 119. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1251. See also the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Park, finding 
that  
[t]he Government argues that the conviction may be predicated solely upon a showing 
that the defendant, Park, was the President of the offending corporation. The error here 
is that the Government has confused the element of ‘awareness of wrongdoing’ with the 
element of ‘wrongful action’; Dotterweich dispenses with the need to prove the first of 
those elements but not the second. 
United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 841 (4th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted). 
 120. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1246.  
 121. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 2 (quoting George K. 
Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States, 33 B.U. L. REV. 176, 196 
(1953)) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is 
ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its 
imposition. . . . ‘It is the expression of the community’s hatred, fear, or contempt for the convict 
which alone characterizes physical hardship as punishment.’”). 
 122. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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Some argue that although American law disfavors making a failure to 
act a criminal offense,123 the responsible relation doctrine is a form of 
criminal omission124 that “substitutes a breach of a duty to act for the 
conventional act requirement.”125 Nonetheless, the FDCA does not 
delineate a wrongful act at all, but rather causes a ‘responsible officer’ to be 
guilty merely by his status126 in the corporate hierarchy.127 This raises 
serious constitutional issues as it violates an individual’s due process 
rights.128 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1275.  
 124. Id. at 1274. The author clarifies this point in noting that “the defendant is liable for his 
failure to act to prevent or correct a violation, rather than for affirmative misconduct.” Id. 
 125. Id. at 1269.; To further this point, a well-known law firm explained that  
[c]ommission of the crime requires only an act. The act need not have been intentional 
or reckless, or even negligent. It is irrelevant what the defendant knew or should have 
known. If a drug is misbranded or adulterated, or if a misbranded or adulterated drug is 
distributed . . . someone . . . has committed a crime. 
Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10.  
 126. An expert on directors’ and officers’ liability insurance issues discusses in his blog: 
[T]he idea that liability can be imposed on an individual for corporate misconduct, in 
apparent disregard of the corporate form and without culpable involvement or even a 
requirement of a culpable state of mind, seems inconsistent with the most basic 
concepts surrounding the corporate form. The doctrine arguably imposes liability for 
nothing more than a person’s status. The word “responsible” in the doctrine’s name 
does not mean that the individual is responsible for the misconduct, but on that that the 
individual is responsible for the corporation. 
Kevin LaCroix, More About the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, D&O DIARY (Mar. 8, 
2010, 4:24 AM), http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/03/articles/corporate-governance/more-about 
-the-responsible-corporate-officer-doctrine/print.html (emphasis in original). 
 127. This point is discussed in WilmerHale’s publication, stating that 
[e]ven more remarkable is that for certain classes of people, even a bad act is 
unnecessary to secure a criminal conviction under the FDCA. In particular, the 
executives and managers of the companies that make, distribute, and sell 
pharmaceuticals can be convicted for violating the FDCA without having personally 
participated in the act being punished or having been an accessory to it. For these 
persons, it is enough to secure a conviction that (a) a prohibited act took place 
somewhere within the company, and (b) the defendant’s position within the company 
was one that gave him or her responsibility and authority either to prevent the violation 
or to correct it. In other words, the crime is being in the wrong position at the wrong 
time. It is not just strict liability; it is strict, vicarious liability. 
Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10 (emphasis in original).  
 128. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1269. In deciding United States v. Park, the Fourth Circuit 
stated: 
It is argued by the prosecution that the requirement of such proof will make 
enforcement more difficult. Nevertheless, the requirements of due process are intended 
to favor fairness and justice over ease of enforcement. We perceive nothing harsh about 
requiring proof of personal wrongdoing before sanctioning the imposition of criminal 
penalties. 
United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 842 (4th Cir. 1974). 
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Another attempt to justify the “omission” rationale is the idea that 
“responsible” corporate officers “[assume] a contractual obligation to 
protect the general public from certain hazards.”129 This argument also 
quickly loses force because basic contract, business association, and agency 
law all dictate that in this context the officer has established a relationship 
with the corporation, not the public.130 For example, an officer’s violation 
of the FDCA would make the medical device company, not the officer, 
liable to the public based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.131 
The responsible corporate officer doctrine is not only applicable to 
high-ranking officers.132 Thus, it should be used to prosecute lower-level 
managers and employees who have direct responsibility for the conduct that 
caused an FDCA violation. Any employee holding a position of authority 
and responsibility who is accountable for even the smallest aspect of the 
corporate operations should be held criminally liable under this doctrine, 
not just the CEO or other figurehead executive.133 To further illustrate this 
point, imagine Acme, Inc., a medical device manufacturing company of 
heart defibrillators that has numerous worldwide corporate affiliations 
assisting with the production of its medical devices. One such affiliation is 
with a foreign manufacturer that produces a component of the heart device, 
which is incorporated into Acme’s product. Suppose Smith, a lower-level 
manager of that foreign corporation, fails to monitor the employees for 
whom he is directly responsible, and a manufacturing error results, causing 
some of the devices to malfunction. Several years later, perhaps even after 
Smith has left the corporation, the manufacturing error is discovered when 
patients are harmed as a result of the malfunction in Acme’s medical 
device. Who is to blame? According to the responsible corporate officer 
doctrine, all of Acme’s managers and executives who stand in ‘responsible 
relation’ to the manufacturing error could be held liable. But this is not how 
the responsible corporate officer doctrine is currently being used with the 
FDCA. It would make more sense if Smith were held liable since he was 
directly responsible for the error and should have at least informed his 
manager of it. In fact, this would be the only rational way to remedy and 
prevent similar errors from occurring in the future. Punishing only the 
highest-ranking corporate officer will do nothing to deter lower-level 
managers from committing similar violations in the future since they are not 
being held accountable. Some argue that the high-ranking corporate 
official’s job responsibility is to oversee all corporate operations and ensure 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1281.  
 130. Id. at 1282. The Fourth Circuit explains: “It is the defendant’s relation to the criminal acts, 
not merely his relation to the corporation, which the jury must consider; 21 U.S.C. § 331 is 
concerned with criminal conduct and not proprietary relationships.” Park, 499 F.2d at 841. 
 131. See Ved P. Nanda, Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is a New Approach 
Warranted?, 58 AM. J. CORP. L. 605, 607 (2010). 
 132. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1286.  
 133. Id.  
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that the medical device company does not violate the FDCA and any other 
applicable laws.134 Yet, it is irrational to believe that one individual can 
monitor and know everything about every aspect of the corporation and its 
affiliate corporations, especially since medical device manufacturers 
employ thousands of people and have operations spanning across the 
country and even around the globe.135 
Another important implication arising from prosecutions based on the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine is the difficulty, if not impossibility, 
of individual officers to successfully plead not guilty when the company 
chooses to plead guilty.136 Basic principles of business associations and 
agency law define a corporation as an entity that can only act through its 
agents (i.e., individual employees). Considering this, it would be difficult 
for a jury to reconcile finding the officer not guilty when the corporation 
pled guilty to the same FDCA violation. This is further complicated by the 
fact that plea agreements made with the corporation typically require full 
disclosure of company information to assist with the prosecution of the 
individual executive(s). The executive is essentially stripped of his 
constitutional rights because he is left with no other choice than to plead 
guilty and face the harsh criminal penalties imposed by the FDCA. With 
everything “stacked in favor” of the government, he does not have a fair 
chance at trial. Even if the individual decides to plead not guilty to charges 
brought based on his status as a “responsible corporate officer,” there are 
very few defenses available.137 Furthermore, the available defenses are 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. at 1282.  
 135. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-22.  
 136. FDA-regulated companies will often find it more cost effective and beneficial for the long-
term survival of the company to plead guilty. FDA guidelines and DOJ manuals indicate that they 
will be more lenient on companies that plead guilty and cooperate with the FDA investigation and 
prosecution. Cooperation often involves the company assisting the government with the 
prosecution of the high-ranking corporate officials, who have also been charged with the FDCA 
violation(s). These corporations are threatened with the possibility of being barred from having 
future products obtain FDA-approval, which would undoubtedly negatively impact the 
corporations’ prosperity. Clearly, so as to not breach their fiduciary duty, the boards of directors 
will choose to cooperate with the government, regardless of how this will affect the individuals 
who are charged. It should also be recognized that no matter how comprehensive a corporation’s 
compliance program is, other errors or violations may exist at any given time. Therefore, it is in 
the company’s best interest to plead guilty because upon investigation, the government may find 
other violations, and for failing to enter into a plea agreement to the alleged charges, the 
government could then aggressively prosecute the company for these other violations. The 
company is cornered just as much as the individual corporate executives are in these situations. 
See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1380–82 (2009); see also Nanda, supra note 131, at 613–14.  
 137. Lundquist & Conroy, supra note 8, at 24–25. One expert outlined the following defenses 
to FDCA violation allegations: 
[C]riminal estoppel is based on the notion that when those responsible for enforcing the 
law are aware of the allegedly violative behavior, yet explicitly or implicitly condone or 
ignore it, justice would dictate that those same officials not be allowed to later punish 
that behavior. 
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“amorphous and ambiguous,” which raises serious fairness issues about the 
doctrine’s use.138 Being charged automatically imputes guilt.139 
III. UNITED STATES V. GUIDANT 
A. MAJOR MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURER CHARGED WITH 
VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCA 
On February 25, 2010, Guidant, LLC, a medical device manufacturer, 
and its top executives, were charged with criminal violations of the FDCA 
related to safety problems with some of the company’s implantable 
cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs).140 After a four-year investigation, a 
criminal information was filed in the District Court for the District of 
Minnesota alleging that Guidant and its executives concealed information 
regarding catastrophic failures of some of the company’s ICDs.141 
                                                                                                                 
   . . . The defendant must show that he relied on the misinformation and that 
reliance was reasonable. 
. . . . 
   Substantive defenses, of course, may be asserted in prosecutions under the FDCA. 
Some of these defenses may center on such issues as whether the food was, indeed, 
adulterated, whether the drug was mislabeled, or whether false statements were actually 
made. 
. . . . 
   Impossibility was recognized as a defense to FDCA violations in United States v. 
Park . . . . [The impossibility defense] “is raised when defendant introduces sufficient 
evidence of the exercise of extraordinary care to justify placing an additional burden on 
the government — that of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that had defendant indeed 
exercised such extraordinary care, he could have prevented or corrected these 
violations.” 
Id. (emphasis in original) (citing 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Gel Spice Co., 601 F. 
Supp. 1205, 1213 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)).  
 138. Michael W. Peregrine & Joshua T. Buchman, Alerting the ‘C-Suite;’ The Responsible 
Corporate Officer Doctrine, AM. HEALTH LAW. ASS’N 2 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www 
.mwe.com/info/pubs/AHLA_0210.pdf. 
 139. See generally Gurney et al., supra note 1.  
 140. United States v. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d. 903, 907 (D. Minn. 2010). ICDs are Class 
III  
lifesaving devices used to detect and treat abnormal heart rhythms that can result in 
sudden cardiac death . . . . The devices, once surgically implanted, constantly monitor 
the electrical activity in a patient’s heart for deadly electrical rhythms and deliver an 
electrical shock to the heart in an effort to return the heartbeat to normal. If they fail to 
operate properly when needed, a person can die within minutes. 
Defibrillator Maker Pleads Guilty; Penalty to Exceed $296 Million, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & 
SAFETY (Apr. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Defibrillator Maker Pleads Guilty], available at http:// 
ohsonline.com/articles/2010/04/07/defib-maker-pleads-guilty.aspx. 
 141. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Medical Device Manufacturer 
Guidant Charged in Failure to Report Defibrillator Safety Problems to FDA (Feb. 25, 2010) 
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In 2002, Guidant became aware that one of its ICDs was prone to 
failure, rendering the device inoperative and unable to deliver lifesaving 
therapy.142 Guidant, however, neglected to alert the FDA of this 
information143 as required by the applicable regulation.144 Guidant 
subsequently changed the design to correct the problem,145 but falsely 
submitted a “Product Update” to the FDA, stating that the changes did not 
affect the device’s safety or efficacy.146 Yet, the design changes were 
specifically made to correct this flaw.147 In 2004, Guidant discovered a 
similar problem with two more of its ICDs.148 During that year, a twenty-
one-year-old college student with one of Guidant’s malfunctioning ICDs 
                                                                                                                 
[hereinafter Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10-civ 
-202.html. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Defibrillator Maker Pleads Guilty, supra note 140.  
 144. 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a) (2010) (“If you are a manufacturer, you must report to us no later 
than 30 calendar days after the day that you receive or otherwise become aware of information, 
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contributed to a death or serious injury; or (2) Has malfunctioned and this device or a similar 
device that you market would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if the 
malfunction were to recur.”); Id. § 803.53 (“You must submit a 5-day report to us . . . no later than 
5 work days after the day that you become aware that: (a) An MDR reportable event necessitates 
remedial action to prevent an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health. You may 
become aware of the need for remedial action from any information, including any trend analysis; 
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specified in the written request. We may extend the time period stated in the ordinal written 
request if we determine it is in the interest of the public health.”); Id. § 803.3 (defining a MDR 
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would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury if the malfunction were to 
recur”). 
 145. Thomas M. Burton & Anna Wilde Matthews, Guidant Sold Heart Device After 
Discovering Flaw, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005, at D3. 
 146. Press Release, supra note 141.  
(a) Each device manufacturer . . . shall submit a written report to FDA of any correction 
or removal of a device initiated by such manufacturer . . . if the correction or removal 
was initiated:  
(1) To reduce a risk to health posed by the device; or  
(2) To remedy a violation of the act caused by the device which may present a risk 
to health . . . .  
(b) The manufacturer . . . shall submit any report required by paragraph (a) of this 
section within 10-working days of initiating such correction or removal  
21 C.F.R. § 806.10 (emphasis added). Section 806.1(b) outlines the several actions that are 
exempt from the reporting requirements, including “[a]ctions taken by device manufacturers . . . to 
improve the performance or quality of a device but that do not reduce a risk to health posed by the 
device or remedy a violation of the act caused by the device.” Id. § 806.1(b). 
 147. Press Release, supra note 141.  
 148. Id.  
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died when the device short-circuited and failed to shock his heart back into 
rhythm.149 The patient’s doctors notified Guidant of this event, but the 
company decided not to inform the FDA.150 Guidant sent a “Product 
Update” communication to physicians, which instructed caretakers on how 
to monitor the device to avoid potential risks posed by the short-
circuiting.151 Despite this, Guidant neglected to alert the FDA about this 
action within the required ten days.152 At least seven individuals with 
Guidant ICDs died as a result of the malfunctioning device.153 Guidant 
executives contended that they complied with FDA regulations by reporting 
the “manufacturing enhancements” of the ICDs in their 2003 annual 
report.154 According to Guidant, the changes made to the ICDs were so 
minor that they did not fall under the reportable medical device changes 
category,155 as required under 21 C.F.R. § 806.10. In defense of the other 
charge—that they failed to notify the FDA of their awareness that a patient 
had suffered a serious bodily injury or death as a result of their 
malfunctioning medical device, as required under 21 C.F.R. § 803.53—
Guidant argued that it did not believe it would be wise to startle the public 
and cause patients to undergo risky surgical removal of the device because 
it considered the occurrence of the malfunctioning to be statistically 
insignificant.156 There were over 37,000 implanted devices157 and only 
twenty-six known adverse events.158 The figurehead Guidant executives, 
who were charged with the FDCA violations, may or may not have known 
about the defect, but perhaps other lower-level executives responsible for 
the engineering operations of the ICDs did know.159 The government did 
not conduct a focused investigation of the operations to uncover the direct 
culprit.160 Under the strict-liability misdemeanor penalty in the FDCA, it 
does not matter what the charged official knew or did not know.161 Using 
figureheads as scapegoats and not holding the person(s) directly responsible 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Barry Meier, Heart Device Sold Despite Flaw, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2005, at 
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 150. See Press Release, supra note 141.  
 151. See id.  
 152. CPB Open Cases: U.S. v. Guidant LLC, OFFICE OF CONSUMER LITIGATION, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE (Apr. 27, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/civil/cpb/cases/cases/guidant/index 
.html. 
 153. Barry Meier, More Deaths Are Linked to Device, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at C.1. 
 154. Heart Device Sold Despite Flaw, Data Shows, supra note 149. 
 155. Id.  
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 157. Burton & Matthews, supra note 145.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Barry Meier, Files Show Guidant Foresaw Some Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at C.1. 
 160. Guidant and its executives quickly entered into a plea agreement upon being charged with 
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for the error liable ensures that these types of occurrences are likely to 
happen again. 
B. CONTROVERSIAL PLEA AGREEMENT 
Guidant and its executives were charged with two counts of violations 
of the FDCA for submitting a false and misleading report to the FDA 
regarding changes made to two of the company’s ICDs.162 On April 5, 
2010, Guidant pled guilty to the two misdemeanor charges pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. § 333(a)(1).163 After entering into negotiations with the government, 
the plea agreement was submitted to Judge Donavan W. Frank of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Minnesota for approval.164 The plea 
consisted of dropping the criminal charges against the individual executives 
and requiring Guidant to pay a criminal fine of $253,962,251 and 
$42,079,675 in criminal forfeiture fees, which only amounted to a 1 percent 
fine to the company.165 Judge Frank rejected the parties’ plea agreement, 
finding it not to be “in the best interests of justice and . . . not [to] serve the 
public’s interests because [it does] not adequately address Guidant’s history 
and the criminal conduct at issue.”166 This decision came after Drs. Hauser 
and Maron—the treating physicians of the twenty-one-year-old who died as 
a result of the defective device—wrote Judge Frank, urging him to reject 
the plea agreement.167 The physicians considered the agreement 
unsatisfactory, as the government agreed not to prosecute the company and 
the individuals whose “egregious act[s]” caused patients to “die[] or suffer[] 
pain and mental anguish as the direct result of Guidant’s illegal and 
unethical behavior.”168 As noted in the decision rejecting the agreement, the 
judge urged the parties to incorporate probation provisions and resubmit the 
plea.169 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 905.  
 163. Id. at 915.  
 164. Id. at 921.  
 165. Id. at 908.  
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IV. TIME FOR CHANGE—PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FDCA 
A. INCORPORATING A MENS REA ELEMENT INTO THE 
MISDEMEANOR PENALTY 
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 333(a), the criminal penalty 
provisions of the FDCA, as holding corporations and/or individuals who 
violate any provision of § 331 of the Act liable without proof of criminal 
intent (i.e., strict liability).170 In light of the recent interest in prosecuting 
FDCA violations made by health care industry corporations and their top 
executives, supported by the Court’s controversial decisions,171 § 333(a)(1), 
the misdemeanor provision, should be rewritten to include a mens rea 
requirement of at least criminal negligence or reckless conduct. Subsections 
333(a) and (b) of the FDCA set forth misdemeanor and felony penalties for 
acts in violation of Title 21 of the Federal Code of Regulations—Food and 
Drugs.172 As it stands, these ambiguously written criminal provisions and 
their interpretations strip individuals of their constitutional due process 
rights and run afoul of fundamental corporate law principles, as well as 
accepted canons of statutory interpretation. Authorizing federal prosecutors 
to go on a tirade against health care company executives with these vague 
and unfair criminal statutes has the unsettling potential to make criminals 
out of law-abiding businesspeople.173 Congressional action will not only 
protect the innocent in the corporate world, but will also prevent future 
adverse effects on patients from adulterated medical devices, and achieve 
the FDA’s ultimate goal of securing public health and safety.174 
Congress is currently debating whether to criminalize product liability 
tort law to ensure corporate accountability.175 A Senate Judiciary Hearing 
was held on March 10, 2010, where several experts in the product-
manufacturing and defective product liability law fields were questioned 
regarding this controversial step.176 One expert in tort law, Mr. Victor E. 
Schwartz, testified at the hearing and raised the hotly contested issue over 
the current excessive punitive damage awards imposed on manufacturers.177 
Some experts take the stance that these high punitive penalties are 
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necessary to encourage manufacturers to be more vigilant in their product 
safety.178 It has been argued, however, that even these excessive punitive 
damage awards are not achieving their intended deterrent effect and, 
therefore, criminal penalties must be added.179 Mr. Schwartz warns the 
committee,  
[P]unitive damages have run wild in this country and people don’t know 
when they are going to be punished or how they are going to be punished 
or where. It is over-heated at this point, and that is why constitutional 
constraints have been put on punitive damages. It is really not a wise thing 
right now to add yet another vague alternative and make it criminal. 
. . . . 
In a nutshell, . . . [w]e don’t want manufacturers to be killing people, 
but to put a crime based on the topic of defect [which is a vaguely defined 
term in tort law] is putting a crime based on a fog.180 
This debate over criminalizing tort product liability is highly relevant to 
the controversial misdemeanor provisions under the FDCA. Experts worry 
that imposing criminal sanctions based on vague tort law concepts will have 
a “chilling effect on law-abiding companies.”181 In the same vein, 
prosecuting corporate executives under the FDCA’s misdemeanor provision 
without proof of criminal intent or any knowledge with respect to the 
violation will have a similar chilling effect. 
There are several reasons why the misdemeanor provision must be 
amended. First, the Supreme Court’s two controversial decisions on the 
interpretation of the misdemeanor provision are outdated and, thus, must be 
revisited.182 The health care manufacturing industry, and corporations in 
general, have expanded and changed significantly since those decisions 
were passed down.183 In 1943, when Dotterweich was decided, 
pharmaceutical companies were more akin to “mom-and-pop” apothecaries 
than to today’s complex, multi-faceted international manufacturing 
corporations, such as Guidant, LLC and Johnson & Johnson, Inc. At the 
time of Dotterweich, executives were capable of directly overseeing all day-
to-day activities and could reasonably be held liable under a “knew or 
should have known” standard. Today, it is virtually impossible for high-
ranking individuals to be aware of every manufacturing operation in the 
corporation. Some may argue that executives who sign their employment 
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contracts assume the responsibility of ensuring the corporation complies 
with every aspect of not only the FDCA but all other applicable laws and 
regulations as well. This, however, is a naïve assumption and an impossible 
onus to impose on executives in this day and age, with thousands of 
employees directly and indirectly associated with corporations that make 
hundreds of thousands of products.  
Today’s complex corporate structure must be considered when 
amending the FDCA’s misdemeanor provision. There are numerous officers 
and managers holding positions of authority in the corporate hierarchy; 
therefore, it is necessary to revise the policy under the responsible corporate 
officer doctrine, which currently endorses the prosecution of all high-
ranking officials who might have some remote responsibility, regardless of 
their involvement in the FDCA violation. Instead, prosecutorial policies 
should not center on using the figurehead executives as scapegoats, but 
rather should focus on conducting investigations that uncover the direct 
managerial culprit, as well as the individual employees who were aware of 
the conduct that caused the FDCA violation and failed to report it. 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 333(a) as a strict-liability 
criminal provision is highly controversial.184 According to the fundamental 
principles of criminal law, “[p]ublic-welfare offenses are the most common 
examples of . . . strict-liability offenses. . . . [H]owever, a statute that is 
silent regarding mens rea may, nonetheless, be interpreted as requiring at 
least some minimal level of mens rea.”185 “[I]f the penalty is light, 
involving a relatively small fine and not including imprisonment, then mens 
rea probably is not required.”186 Since FDCA violations do carry substantial 
fines and imprisonment sentences, it is highly unlikely that Congress 
intended for this to be one of the rare federal strict-liability offenses. In fact, 
there is no suggestion that this was Congress’ intention. Constitutional due 
process rights also support the argument against a strict-liability 
interpretation. Federal prosecutors are permitted to impose imprisonment 
penalties on corporate executives without proving that they had any 
involvement in the FDCA violation. Once slapped with a criminal 
indictment, high-ranking executives are left with no other option than to 
plead guilty and pay the consequences for someone else’s misconduct. With 
the proposed mental culpability attached to the misdemeanor provision, the 
prosecutor would be required to prove that the individual executive had 
some intent regarding the conduct. The individual will then at least be able 
to raise the defense that he did not have any knowledge or involvement with 
the violation. 
                                                                                                                 
 184. Id. at F-13.  
 185. CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 173–74.  
 186. United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), discussed in 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 173. 
618 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
B. PROSECUTORIAL POLICY CHANGES AND ITS IMPACT 
A policy change when enforcing this provision, which includes a 
rebuttable presumption of innocence187 with respect to the individual 
executives, should also be adopted.188 This would be consistent with the 
congressional purpose to facilitate public reliance on the integrity of 
corporate officers, as well as constitutional and criminal procedure 
principles that an individual is innocent until proven guilty.189 There are, 
however, circumstances when figurehead executives may be criminally 
liable for the alleged FDCA violations. This note is not concerned with such 
instances. Instead, this note focuses on those individuals who have 
absolutely no knowledge of the conduct that caused an FDCA violation and 
could not possibly have realized these infractions due to the complexity and 
vastness of modern manufacturing corporations.190 
Furthermore, a policy change with respect to plea agreements must be 
adopted. The Guidant scandal demonstrates the problems that exist under 
the current policy. The government entered into a plea agreement to drop 
charges against the individual executives in exchange for Guidant handing 
the government a $296 million criminal fine.191 As noted in the court’s 
decision that rejected the plea agreement, victims of the criminal conduct do 
not get any of the money;192 it all goes to the government. This raises 
several concerns. First, it limits the amount of money the victims will be 
able to recover in any potential class action product liability suit. In 
addition, these criminal fines merely come out of the pocket of the 
shareholders,193 having little to no effect on the corporation or the 
executives who allegedly committed these offenses, and thus provides no 
incentive for the company or its executives to reform. It is apparent that the 
government’s use of the no-intent misdemeanor provision against the 
company and the figurehead executives is nothing more than a threat to 
induce plea agreements that will result in exorbitant amounts of money 
going into the government’s pocket.194 The prosecutor needs to do nothing 
more than charge a medical device manufacturer and its executives with an 
FDCA offense, making this arguably a simple and cost-effective way to 
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increase the government’s revenue. If the government was serious about 
deterring individuals who allegedly committed criminal acts under the 
FDCA, it would not have entered into a plea agreement for just monetary 
penalties, but instead would have insisted on imprisoning the guilty 
individuals.195 But it is clearly not the government’s intent to promote the 
goals of the FDA, which are designed to protect the public and the patient. 
Based on the facts given in the Guidant case, it is highly likely that the 
company and its executives were liable for the alleged violations, and had 
they gone forward with trial rather than entering into a plea agreement, they 
would have been found guilty under the strict-liability misdemeanor 
provision. Under my proposed amendment, which would require some 
proof of knowledge and with the new prosecutorial policies, Guidant and its 
executives would not have “gotten away with murder” like they did. In fact, 
they would perhaps have faced serious and well-deserved jail time, but at 
least they would have been given a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
My proposal to both amend the misdemeanor provision of the FDCA, 
requiring proof of some criminal intent, and adopt prosecutorial policy 
changes will achieve several goals. First, it will protect executives who had 
absolutely no knowledge of or involvement in the FDCA violation. 
Requiring proof of some mens rea will ensure that businesspeople are not 
forced to plead guilty because they do not have a viable defense. Second, it 
protects the corporation and its shareholders from having to pay exorbitant 
criminal fines. Third, the policy changes will ensure that those who are 
found guilty under the revised FDCA criminal provisions will be sent to jail 
rather than allowing them to enter into plea agreements, which do nothing 
to combat recidivism. Lastly, but most importantly, these changes will 
promote the ultimate goal of ensuring that these types of violations do not 
occur again, protecting patients’ health and well-being. 
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